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LAW FOR THE EMPIRE: THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL 
AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL DIVERSITY
LAUREN BENTON* AND KATHRYN WALKER**
INTRODUCTION
The singularity of the American Revolution has long separated the 
study of colonial America from the comparative analysis of European co-
lonialism. Recent scholarship has chipped away at this division, emphasiz-
ing the revolution’s anti-imperial character and exploring its wide-ranging 
influence in other parts of the British Empire—and other parts of the world 
not under British control. Yet despite this questioning of the standard narra-
tive of discontinuity between the so-called first and second empires, and 
despite the emergence of a broadly comparative field of colonial history, 
the legal history of the thirteen colonies retains residual characteristics of 
its insular development as a subfield. In particular, it is difficult for histori-
ans to shake the habit of framing legal research about the colonial period in 
ways intended ultimately to explain the revolution or American constitu-
tional debates. This forward-looking perspective sits at odd angles along-
side works that seek a contemporary set of reference points such as the late-
eighteenth-century legal history of the Iberian and French empires, the 
influence of parallel engagements in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, 
or continuities with continental jurisprudence.1
In the two published and two planned volumes of The Common Law 
in Colonial America, William E. Nelson does not set out to bridge the di-
vide between the familiar preoccupation with revolutionary origins and 
recently explored global connections.2 Yet his volumes contribute to an 
* Lauren Benton is Silver Professor of History and Affiliated Professor of Law at New York University.
** Kathryn Walker is a doctoral candidate, Department of History, New York University.
1. Recent contributions to the comparative legal history of the late eighteenth century are too 
numerous to list here; examples include, on French imperial law, see generally MALICK W. GHACHEM,
THE OLD REGIME AND THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION (2012), on the influence of South Atlantic revolu-
tionary currents on British imperial politics in South Asia, CHRISTOPHER A. BAYLY, RECOVERING 
LIBERTIES: INDIAN THOUGHT IN THE AGE OF LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE 42-73 (David Armitage et al. 
eds., 2012), and on continental influences on American federalism, see generally ALISON L. LACROIX,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010).
2. See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660 (2008) [hereinafter NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND]; 2 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MIDDLE COLONIES AND THE 
CAROLINAS, 1660-1730 (2013) [hereinafter NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES].
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effective merger of the two projects. In analyzing legal diversity and in 
seeking to identify early elements of legal convergence, Nelson’s series 
addresses questions central to the comparative history of empire and law.
Nelson has collected and sorted an impressive archive of court records 
from the colonies, and he draws from these records to map the patterns 
produced as colonists adapted the common law in colonial contexts. Nelson 
frames the four-volume series as a necessary correction to a flawed yet 
dominant approach to the study of American colonial law. Too many legal 
historians, he tells us, have chased the goal of understanding the degree to 
which law in the colonies mimicked or diverged from English law. Nelson 
warns that our inadequate grasp of early modern English law makes such 
comparisons elusive at best, misleading at worst. His goal is different: to 
compare colonies to one another and to document the variety of legal sys-
tems in American colonies and the differing ways that they incorporated 
the common law. Only this method, he suggests, can give us the materials 
for understanding how different colonial legal systems assembled them-
selves into American law, in the process underpinning the revolution and 
the constitutional framework it engendered.3
In pointing to this last objective—understanding legal convergence—
Nelson links the history of seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-
century colonial law to the more fully researched late-eighteenth-century 
revolutionary era’s legal transformations. The American Revolution is a 
familiar ghostly presence, and Nelson’s interest in convergence keeps the 
specter on stage, if in the shadows. This staging requires us to look at Nel-
son’s texts from an odd angle to assess how his perspective contributes to 
comparative colonial histories. We must conduct this interpretative exercise 
at a level of abstraction that might make Nelson, a historian who chooses to 
stay close to his sources, uneasy. It is nonetheless a worthwhile undertaking 
because it connects Nelson’s findings to puzzles of legal diversity and legal 
convergence in other empires, as well as in later phases of the British Em-
pire.
The volumes of The Common Law in America address fundamental 
questions about how law constituted empire: What sets of factors, from 
local politics to religious differences to environmental and geopolitical 
pressures, forged legal diversity in empires? When and in what measure did 
law serve as a force of divergence or of convergence? Does it make sense 
to label congeries of colonies operating with desultory oversight as com-
prising an empire, much less as an empire of law?
3. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 4-6.
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Our article surveys Nelson’s answers to such questions and places 
them in the company of contrasting approaches to the relation between 
colonial legal diversity and the constitution of empires. The article begins 
by characterizing Nelson’s findings about the diverse conditions and legal 
politics of the American colonies. It then considers historians’ attempts, 
using two other approaches, to understand legal diversity in empires. One 
approach analyzes cross-colonial connections to bring into focus the ways 
that decentralized processes composed networks that influenced colonial 
law and its variations. The other approach investigates ideologies, jurispru-
dence, and administrative schemes in metropolitan centers and traces their 
impact on the creation of empires as variegated legal fields. We survey
both approaches, providing illustrations mainly related to the English (later 
British) and Spanish empires. Together with Nelson’s methodology of 
comparing colonial legal systems to one another, these two approaches 
compose a powerful triptych: trans-colonial processes, metropolitan pro-
cesses, and local legal politics. Considered together, these perspectives 
allow us to understand Nelson’s project as more than a healthy corrective 
for colonial legal history and a valuable survey of colonial court records. 
The Common Law in America offers a distinctive story about how law 
composed empires: slowly, one case and one colonial legal system at a 
time.
I. LEGAL DIVERSITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA
Nelson describes a startling array of emerging systems of law in colo-
nial America. In Massachusetts, worries about the arbitrary authority of 
magistrates drove the colonists’ urge to codify law. In Virginia, the politics 
of property created incentives for clear legal rules. In both places, the 
common law arrived late, as part of a broader search for order. In New 
York, within a generation of the assumption of control by the English, the 
common law had superseded Dutch law in the lower Hudson Valley and 
had largely supplanted the Puritan law of towns leading to New England. 
Lord Baltimore in Maryland embraced the common law for the protections 
that it offered Catholics and their property in the new colony. The pressures 
of the Indian trade, slavery, and Atlantic commerce dominated law in South 
Carolina. In North Carolina, the governor’s autocratic hand pushed the 
common law into the background and turned legal forums into arenas of 
political conflict. Pennsylvania’s Quaker elites designed a “government by 
judiciary” that sheltered robust common-law development.4 In Delaware 
4. NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES, supra note 2, at 100.
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and New Jersey, judges found ways to apply elements of the law of Eng-
land and the common law, while allowing room for the law to work to pro-
tect local norms.
Nelson constructs such generalizations by perceiving patterns in court 
records. Virginia cases involving harsh penalties for disrupting land and 
labor arrangements sat within the context of a sparse record of cases pun-
ishing adultery.5 Massachusetts courts seemed unable to withhold their 
attention from cases involving “sin” or the crime of espousing Quaker be-
liefs.6 In all the colonies, Nelson shows, the criminal law carried special 
burdens of representing and pursuing the policies and preferences of elites.7
Enforcing the peace had some unpredictable results, as when, to give one 
example, John and Walter Winter were found guilty and were hanged for 
killing Indians in their house-turned-fort on the edges of Pennsylvania set-
tlement.8
Whereas Nelson relies above all on analysis of colonial court records, 
he does not isolate the law as a force within colonial society. Instead, legal 
diversity figures in his narrative as a phenomenon derived from and inter-
acting with other differences. As he argues most explicitly in the volume on 
the middle colonies and the Carolinas, the common law was central in their 
early legal systems without, however, erasing the tendency to legal diver-
gence. The “top-down policies of imposing the common law” bumped up 
against “bottom-up pressures” to preserve local norms and practices.9 In 
Massachusetts, Puritans drew from scripture in making law, but this tactic 
did not drive the evolution of the colonial legal system, which instead took 
shape as a result of legal strategies forged by local politics. In most cases, 
Nelson is referring to a kind of politics that intersected with law, and the 
term “legal politics” would apply well.10 Ruptures also come into view and 
crowd the volumes’ narratives: the 1720 collapse of North Carolina’s judi-
cial system, for example, or Lewis Morris’s challenge to the legitimacy of 
the judiciary in East Jersey that spawned a “state of chaos.”11
In this telling, legal diversity becomes an aspect of a broader phenom-
enon of colonial diversity. Without describing the full set of distinctive 
5. Id. at 41-47.
6. Id. at 53-57.
7. Id. at 129.
8. Id. at 111.
9. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 7-8.
10. On “legal politics” as an analytic category in imperial legal history, see Lauren Benton, 
Introduction: Forum on Law and Empire in Global Perspective, 117 AM. HISTORICAL REV 1093 
(2012).
11. NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES, supra note 2, at 92, 136.
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conditions that prevailed in each colony, Nelson highlights anomalies and 
portrays colonial legal systems as both reflecting and contributing to legal 
diversity. Yet Nelson also recognizes that his analysis must account some-
how for the tendency to adopt the common law and make it central to the 
colonial legal order everywhere. Even as he highlights legal diversity, Nel-
son fits the different stories into a broader narrative of convergence. He 
tells us in his Introduction to Volume I that the project aims to understand 
why and how such radically different legal systems merge into “American 
law.”12 Most of this story of convergence, Nelson explains, will come in 
the second half of the series, in volumes that detail colonial responses to 
increasingly intrusive imperial policies.13 In some respects, the result of 
this approach is to reproduce the known trajectory of attempted imperial 
consolidation followed by a complexly staged revolt. That is, we could read 
Nelson as arguing that legal diversity matters but only up to a point; local 
conditions created colonial differences, but imperial policies drove conver-
gence. Yet that is a simplistic reading, one that does not do justice to Nel-
son’s findings or his method.
Struggling to emerge from these first two volumes is a theory of legal 
convergence—a way of understanding how we can think of such different 
colonial legal systems as already deeply connected and, also, linked by 
more than just a repeating relationship to the center. In discerning Nelson’s
approach to this problem, we find that not having in print the subsequent 
volumes, which promise to focus more sharply on imperial policies, may be 
a blessing. The first two volumes lay the groundwork for Nelson’s perspec-
tive of the ways that legal convergence developed alongside legal diversity, 
a pairing that may extend beyond American colonies and reflect more gen-
eralized tendencies in empires. In Nelson’s telling, colonists grappled 
mightily to discern the relevance and utility of the common law and to 
design its relationship to other law. In doing so, they contributed to the 
discourse and structure of the imperial constitution—and, ultimately, 
forged what became the framework for revolt against the empire.
How have other historians approached this problem of identifying elu-
sive elements of structure and convergence in geographically diffuse over-
seas territories with politically varied characteristics? The “imperial turn” 
that has swept historiography in the last several decades has produced not 
only a wealth of new studies of imperial law but also warnings against the 
reification of both “empire” and “state.” The “minimal nature of the early-
modern state” combined with “habits of local self-government” constrained 
12. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 6.
13. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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the prospects for imperial governance.14 Certain categories of conflict—
contested definitions of subjecthood, strains involving delegated authority, 
and tensions over jurisdiction—influenced the exercise of colonial authori-
ty and conditioned the responses of colonists and indigenous peoples to 
conquest, settlement, and imperial policy.15
II. CIRCUITS OF IMPERIAL LAW
Although early modern empires operated as complex and flexible 
frameworks for imperial ambitions and communal conflicts rather than as 
structures of command, their approaches to law nevertheless generated 
patterns.16 Some patterns reflected the tendency of imperial agents and 
officials to analyze and sometimes to copy one another’s methods of legal 
administration. English designs on North America, and to some extent their 
visions of colonial order, were in part based on or self-consciously con-
trasted with the Spanish Empire.17 In some places, surprising homologies 
undergirded cross-imperial relations, as when merchant communities that 
already operated with limited jurisdiction over their own affairs inside one 
polity sought to establish a similar legal status within new host polities; 
Portuguese traders in West Africa and the Sephardic diaspora spanning 
Mediterranean empires are cases in point.18 European legal interactions 
were genuinely global in scope, and they relied on some common ap-
proaches to law. For example, Dutch and Portuguese strategies in the Indi-
an Ocean and the Pacific world built on their own history of legal pluralism 
14. DEREK HIRST, DOMINION: ENGLAND AND ITS ISLAND NEIGHBOURS, 1500-1707, at 156
(2012).
15. For instructive examples of this perspective, see LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500-1850
(Lauren A. Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013). On subjecthood and delegated legal authority, see 
LAUREN A. BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400-1900 (2010) [hereinafter BENTON, A SEARCH]. On jurisdictional shifts as a product of colonial 
conflicts, LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN AMERICA
AND AUSTRALIA, 1788-1836 (2010); see also LAUREN A. BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES:
LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400-1900 (2002) [hereinafter BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL 
CULTURES]. 
16. Lauren A. Benton & Richard J. Ross, Empires and Legal Pluralism: Jurisdiction, Sovereign-
ty, and Political Imagination in the Early Modern World, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500-
1850, at 7 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013). Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper make law 
one of their categories of comparison in JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD 
HISTORY: POWER AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (2011).
17. J.H. ELLIOT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA 1492-
1830, at 16 (2007).
18. Lauren Benton, The Legal Regime of the South Atlantic World, 1400-1750: Jurisdictional 
Politics as Institutional Order, 11 J. WORLD HIST. 27, 27-56 (2000); FRANCESCA TRIVELLATO, THE 
FAMILIARITY OF STRANGERS: THE SEPHARDIC DIASPORA, LIVORNO, AND CROSS-CULTURAL TRADE IN 
THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD (2009).
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while adapting to fit with other sovereigns’ understandings of fundamental 
legal elements such as protection and possession.19
Recently, historians have gone further in recording regional and global 
patterns of law, noting that some legal processes unfolding far from impe-
rial centers gave rise to “networks” that helped, in turn, to structure law in 
empires.20 The perspective represents legal diversity as emerging partly 
from the local effects of cross-regional processes that constituted empires 
without leading to homogenization or centralization. Kerry Ward’s study of 
circuits of coerced labor in the Dutch overseas empire offers a particularly 
clear illustration of network analysis of legal diversity.21 Ward shows that 
Dutch East India Company officials banished unruly local subjects in the 
empire, moving them from one Dutch-claimed territory to another, often 
across very long distances. The Dutch East India Company transported 
elites from Batavia to Ceylon and the Cape Colony, and moved lower sta-
tus exiles from the heart of the Cape Colony to its periphery. When thread-
ed through a system of layered sovereignty extending from the 
metropolitan center to the colonies, such practices knitted together the 
points of the empire without requiring a single structure of command or a 
consistent way of categorizing subjects’ legal status. Dutch officials’ local 
legitimacy and power depended on their ability to erect and sustain circuits 
of coerced labor, and these circuits interacted differently with local envi-
ronments to produce a fluid and variegated empire.22
The movement of coerced labor also featured prominently in the for-
mation of other, later imperial networks over which metropolitan officials 
exercised imperfect control. Denver Brunsman traces the history of im-
pressment of sailors for service in the British navy in the long eighteenth 
century as such a phenomenon.23 The navy served as a system of “colonies 
in motion” charged with sustaining itself through the extraction of labor.24
19. On protection as an important element of Dutch relations with Japan, see ADAM CLULOW,
THE COMPANY AND THE SHOGUN: THE DUTCH ENCOUNTER WITH TOKUGAWA JAPAN, 56-57, 174-177 
(2014). On possession and Iberian empires, see Lauren A. Benton, Possessing Empire: Iberian Claims 
and Interpolity Law, in NATIVE CLAIMS: INDIGENOUS LAW AGAINST EMPIRE, 1500-1920, at 19-40 
(Saliha Bellmessous ed., 2011).
20. See, e.g., KERRY WARD, NETWORKS OF EMPIRE: FORCED MIGRATION IN THE DUTCH EAST 
INDIA COMPANY (2008). Ward’s work builds on a broader trend of imperial historians to study empires 
as networks. See, e.g., ALISON GAMES, THE WEB OF EMPIRE: ENGLISH COSMOPOLITANS IN AN AGE OF 
EXPANSION, 1560-1660 (2008). Other historians have used a network approach to analyze cross-
imperial processes. See, e.g., DAVID HANCOCK, OCEANS OF WINE: MADEIRA AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN TRADE AND TASTE (2009).
21. WARD, NETWORKS OF EMPIRE, supra note 20.
22. WARD, NETWORKS OF EMPIRE, supra note 20, at 5-6, 12-13.
23. See DENVER BRUNSMAN, THE EVIL NECESSITY: BRITISH NAVAL IMPRESSMENT IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC WORLD (2013).
24. Id. at 6.
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Latitude for impressment shifted as metropolitan needs and wartime pres-
sures dictated incentives, and sometimes constraints, to magistrates and 
ship captains. The practice manufactured circuits tracing imperial interests, 
with concentrations of impressment activity in places where manpower 
needs intersected with heightened security concerns. Although present 
across the empire, impressment generated legal variation, on land and sea 
as well as in different territories, as it developed in response to “the local 
social, political, and economic conditions of individual . . . seaports and 
regions.”25 At the same time, the practice was constitutive of empire by 
generating the naval capacity that fortified threats of British military action 
on a global scale and by stimulating new legal mechanisms for imperial 
oversight. Like British master and servant law, the law regulating press 
gangs had global reach and formed part of a broader pattern of “negotiated 
authority” over coerced and semi-coerced labor throughout the empire.26
Less organized, and sometimes less well researched, circuits also in-
fluenced the nature of English colonizing and the shape of the British Em-
pire. The movement of merchants and officials, including law-trained 
personnel, affected the development of policies across the “first” and 
“second” British empires. This circulation is often difficult to document 
because it had scant central direction and resulted from combinations of 
patronage, opportunity, and family ties. But its effects were significant. 
Key English “adventurers” and investors in the seventeenth century, such 
as Sir Thomas Smyth, Henry Myddleton, and Thomas Roe, participated in 
both the Virginia Company and the East India Company, and such in-
volvement had the potential to guide legal policy, as when Sir Thomas 
Grantham intervened to exhort demonstrations of loyalty after both Ba-
con’s Rebellion and a revolt at Bombay.27 Cross-regional paths became 
increasingly common. Law-trained Scots joined other Scottish sojourners 
in the Caribbean and North American colonies in the eighteenth century, 
and when Scottish commercial interests suffered from Atlantic upheaval, 
law-trained Scots looked for prospects in the Indian Ocean, playing an 
outsized role in drafting new plans for legal administration in the territories 
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. at 52. On the regulation of labor in the British empire as exercised through the control of 
subordinate jurisdictions, see Lauren Benton, This Melancholy Labyrinth: The Trial of Arthur Hodge 
and the Boundaries of Imperial Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 91 (2012). On master and servant law, see gener-
ally MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955 (Douglas Hay 
and Paul Craven, eds., 2004).
27. Lauren A. Benton, The British Atlantic in Global Context, in THE BRITISH ATLANTIC WORLD,
1500-1800, at 271, 281 (David Armitage & Michael Braddick, eds., 2009); see ALISON GAMES, THE 
WEB OF EMPIRE: ENGLISH COSMOPOLITANS IN AN AGE OF EXPANSION, 1560-1660, at 6 (2009) (dis-
cussing other cases).
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of the East India Company.28 Abolitionists drew on knowledge about colo-
nial law and prize law from men who had done stints in the colonies, and 
the movement in turn dispatched homegrown legal experts to propel the 
campaign against the slave trade in the colonies.29 Men who had served as 
magistrates or judges in one part of the British Empire ended their careers 
in another.30 Military movements influenced the shape of legal policy in the 
empire in far-flung colonies, too; governors drew on their knowledge to 
impose martial law in the face of perceived crises of order.31 Diasporas of 
legal culture were not limited to elites. African captives developed New 
World legal strategies based in part on experiences and political theories of 
law in Africa.32 Soldiers and sailors carried with them ideas about legal 
process, and colonial anxieties about their unruliness often drove conflicts 
over enforcement of the king’s peace.33
The study of such circuits shows that they sometimes formed in a 
search to contain local variation or in pursuit of visions of imperial order. 
The movement of Islamic law judges (qadis) around the Ottoman Empire, 
for example, responded to imperial officials’ recognition that judges were 
easily drawn into legal politics in ways that made all law local.34 The Span-
ish crown’s program of administrative changes, grouped under the rubric of 
the Bourbon reforms, centered on appointments to colonial high courts 
while touching on all aspects of the legal order. Centralizing effects also 
28. See ALAN KARRAS, SOJOURNERS IN THE SUN: SCOTTISH MIGRANTS IN JAMAICA AND THE 
CHESAPEAKE, 1740-1800 (1993); see also MARTHA MCLAREN, BRITISH INDIA AND BRITISH 
SCOTLAND, 1780–1830: CAREER-BUILDING, EMPIRE-BUILDING, AND A SCOTTISH SCHOOL OF 
THOUGHT ON INDIAN GOVERNANCE 249-254 (2001).
29. Lauren A. Benton, This Melancholy Labyrinth, in COLONIAL CONNECTIONS, 1815-45:
PATRONAGE, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 27-30 (2005).
30. A prominent example is Francis Forbes, who served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 
Newfoundland before becoming the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
Many other cases go undetected because it was commonplace for local elites to serve as magistrates, 
and their roles went unremarked in the records except when acute conflicts gained attention in London.
See Lauren A. Benton & Lisa Ford, Magistrates in Empire: Convicts, Slaves, and the Remaking of 
Legal Pluralism in the British Empire, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES 1500-1850, at 173-198 
(Lauren A. Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013). For studies of trans-regional career movements that 
give short shrift to the circulation of legal personnel, see COLONIAL LIVES ACROSS THE BRITISH
EMPIRE: IMPERIAL CAREERING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (David Lambert & Alan Lester 
eds., 2010). On “accountability and tenure” of British colonial judges, see JOHN MCLAREN, DEWIGGED,
BOTHERED, AND BEWILDERED: BRITISH COLONIAL JUDGES ON TRIAL, 1800-1900, at 5. (2011).
31. On the circulation of knowledge about martial law in the nineteenth century empires, see 
RANDE KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005). On 
martial law in penal colonies, see BENTON, A SEARCH, supra note 15, at 217-221.
32. BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES, supra note 15, at 59-66.
33. See, e.g., Lisa Ford, The Pig and the Peace: Transposing Order in Early Sydney, in LAW AND 
POLITICS AND BRITISH COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF EMPIRE 169-196 (Shaunnagh Dorsett 
& Ian Hunter eds., 2010).
34. See Karen Barkey, In Different Times: Scheduling and Social Control in the Ottoman Empire, 
1550-1650, 38 COMP. STUDIES SOC. HIST. 460 (1993).
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could emerge from the movements of legal personnel without direction 
from the metropole. Proposals for strengthening the magistracy of the Brit-
ish Empire in the early nineteenth century took shape in similar ways in 
response to widely distributed colonial conflicts.35 Elaborate systems for 
the sale of colonial posts contributed to a global “institutional revolution” 
in the long eighteenth century.36
Networks and circuits do present some limitations to an understanding 
of law in empire. Most imperial networks were ragged formations with an 
uncertain institutional grounding. For example, we tend to think of finan-
cial networks as very fluid, with monetization of markets flowing like wa-
ter to fill every available crevice. But early modern financial circuits in 
European empires were highly asymmetrical, and the uneven institutional 
landscape for credit slowed the accumulation of capital in some sectors 
while creating odd pockets of opportunity in other sectors.37 The financial 
revolution of late-seventeenth-century England stimulated transfers of cred-
it and even turned investors towards the empire, but the changes left capital 
and its instruments heavily concentrated in England.38
If networks rarely mapped neatly onto legal institutions, it is also the 
case that not all geographically distributed phenomena constituted net-
works. One of the enduring puzzles of law in colonial America is the faint 
imprint of the influx of convicts and servants. Although tens of thousands 
of convicts were transported to Maryland and Virginia in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, they appear only rarely in the colonies’ court 
records, where for decades they seem to have been legally indistinguishable 
from servants and other settlers.39 Historians sometimes have been tempted 
to confuse circulating discourse with evidence of politically and legally 
35. See Benton & Ford, supra note 30.
36. See DOUGLAS W. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: MEASUREMENT AND THE 
ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011).
37. See generally JOSEPH C. MILLER, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY AS HISTORY: A GLOBAL 
APPROACH (2012) (suggesting that such financial asymmetry was responsible for generated large-scale 
slaving by undercapitalized Atlantic merchants). 
38. See CARL WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES OF CREDIT: THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION,
1620-1720, at 197-234 (2011); Benton, supra note 27, at 282.
39. The vast majority were transported in the eighteenth century. A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR 
AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775, at 26-27
(1987). On convicts’ shifting legal status, see Alan Atkinson, The Free-Born Englishman Transported: 
Convict Rights as a Measure of Eighteenth-Century Empire, 144 PAST & PRESENT 88, 89-90 (1998). In 
the seventeenth century, banishment from England and Ireland to the Caribbean, and in the aftermath of 
rebellions on St. Helena and other nodes of the East India Company generated a circuit of sorts, but 
perhaps one without the regularity of the Dutch circuits that Ward observed, and without the coordina-
tion from the center that occurred across European empires in the late eighteenth century. See Lauren 
Benton and Devin Jacob, Imperial Circuits of Law: Dutch East India Company Sovereignty, 2 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 119-25 (2011); BENTON, A SEARCH, supra note 15, at 162-221.
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significant networks. Characterizations of Atlantic rebellions as epiphe-
nomena of anti-authoritarian networks—mostly imagined based on revolu-
tionary utterances (as reported by elites) and synchronic revolts—make this 
mistake.40 Even where there is clearer evidence for cross-colonial move-
ments, the correlation of these movements with colonial legal change can 
be murky. For example, studying impressments can give us a sense of the 
different legal character of the Caribbean and the North Atlantic but only 
along one dimension having to do with naval manpower and not even with 
regard to such related maritime legal processes as the functioning of prize 
courts or the local criminal law’s handling of sailors in ports. Finally, a 
focus on the imperial dimensions of some circuits may obscure their full 
reach and significance—many formative networks spanned multiple em-
pires, such as the webs of producers, merchants, and consumers of the 
eighteenth-century wine trade; official networks undergirding cross-
imperial Caribbean campaigns to contain slave revolts; or the cross-polity 
relations that structured the African slave trade.41 Understanding colonial 
legal diversity through the study of networks and their legal impact is a 
delicate project, one that requires the complement of studies from other 
vantage points.
III. EMPIRE FROM THE CENTER
Just as questions about the contrast between law in England and the 
colonies has influenced the historiography of North American colonial law, 
an implicit comparison of the center and periphery has shaped histories of 
colonial projects as conceived and managed from the metropole. It is easy 
to imagine legal diversity resulting primarily from the gap between metro-
politan designs and colonial execution. Yet administrative and jurispruden-
tial blueprints were often as messy as colonial realities. J.H. Elliot has 
taught us to see Spain as a “composite monarchy,” a political frame within 
which crown legal authority had to contend with multiple rivals, beginning 
with the local laws, or fueros, of its constituent parts.42 The legal relation 
between England and Scotland, Ireland, and Wales developed within a field 
40. John Donoghue follows Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker’s THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA:
SAILORS, SLAVES, COMMONERS, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC
(2000) in imagining revolutionary networks behind Atlantic revolts and anti-authoritarian sentiment. 
See JOHN DONOGHUE, FIRE UNDER THE ASHES: AN ATLANTIC HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
(2013). For a critique of this approach, see David Armitage, The Red Atlantic, 29 REVS. AM. HIST. 479 
(2001).
41. See, e.g., DAVID HANCOCK, OCEANS OF WINE: MADEIRA AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AMERICAN TRADE AND TASTE (2009); Jeppe Mulich, Microregionalism and Intercolonial Relations: 
The Case of the Danish West Indies, 1730-1830, 8 J. GLOBAL HIST. 72 (2013).
42. See J.H. Elliott, A Europe of Composite Monarchies, 137 PAST & PRESENT 48 (1992).
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of tension between visions of legal integration and the persistence of a 
“multiple kingdom” composed of separate legal systems. Within the hearts 
of empires, jurisdictional complexity also prevailed. In England, the unify-
ing promise of the common law, “the most centralized legal system of its 
day,” coexisted with a checkerboard of legal communities that included 
corporate bodies, chartered towns, the northern Marches, and expansive 
estates under the power of aristocrats.43 At the core of Catholic and Islamic 
empires, jurisdictional tensions between religious and secular or crown law 
also infused legal politics.44 This legal landscape was an inhospitable envi-
ronment for centralizing ambitions and an empirical challenge to theories 
of indivisible sovereignty.
In this context, the extent of legal authority of government over distant 
territories remained an open question. For the English empire, historians 
have remarked on the ambiguities of Sir Edward Coke’s opinion in Cal-
vin’s Case.45 The 1608 case was contrived to prompt a ruling about wheth-
er subjects of James VI in Scotland gained the status of English subjects 
when he took the throne as James I of England.46 Coke found that a Scots-
man could not sue in the English common law courts over land located in 
England, but his opinion did not fully resolve the question whether the 
English common law might extend beyond England.47 While seeking to 
solidify the notion of an English common law for England, Coke found it 
necessary to define English legal authority in Ireland, and he might also 
have had the young Virginia colony in mind.48 The result was Coke’s
recognition that ties of subjecthood extended protections of property, in 
effect creating “a state of continuing jurisdictional accountability to the 
Crown” wherever subjects went.49 This affirmation of the portability of 
subjecthood opened the possibility for colonists to claim that the protec-
tions of the common law extended to them.50
Calvin’s Case illustrates a pattern of complexity that prevailed in oth-
er imperial centers. Hierarchies of legal authority were only marginally 
43. HIRST, supra note 14, at 137; Philip Stern, Bundles of Hyphens: Corporations as Legal 
Communities in the Early Modern British Empire, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, supra note 16,
at 21-48.
44. See BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES, supra note 15, at 80-126.
45. See generally Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1608).
46. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN 
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580-1865, at 82-9 (2010).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. HIRST, supra note 14, at 139. 
50. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward 
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 32 L. & HIST. REV. 439 (2003). 
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more transparent in the more centralized Spanish Empire, where officials 
never carefully proscribed such fundamental aspects of legal administration 
as the relationship between governors and audiencias, or high courts, or the 
legal status of Indians. Across and within the viceroyalties of New Spain 
and Peru, legal administration generated new variants on the familiar juris-
dictional complexity of the peninsular legal order.51
The administration of law in early modern empires at any given mo-
ment resembled a cluttered field, or an asymmetrical matrix, rather than a 
scaffold or ordered plan. Recent studies have probed several ways to exam-
ine such complex metropolitan legal cultures. Several trends have pointed 
to insights especially relevant to the study of legal diversity in colonial 
America.
One significant and relatively recent project has been to draw attention 
to the degree to which Europeans drew on Roman legal concepts and terms 
in effecting claims to new territories. Mechanisms for acquiring private 
property in Roman law were used in public law contexts to establish claims 
by signs of occupation or possession.52 Instead of investigating English 
methods of colonizing as distinctive or assuming the centrality of the com-
mon law in English colonial projects, this approach recognizes the availa-
bility and influence of a broad legal repertoire, one that included the 
writing of charters and proprietary grants as claims-making instruments 
intelligible in a civil law context shared across European states and by their 
agents.53
This perspective is valuable not just for debunking “national” stereo-
types of styles of claims-making but also for revealing that from their in-
ception colonial ventures were legal projects. There was no sharp break 
between the flexible legal arguments invoked to stake claims and the con-
stitution of local authority. Establishing jurisdiction, after all, figured in the 
symbolic vocabulary of occupation or possession, and charters and related 
instruments “expressed both sovereign prerogative and the designs that 
projectors created.”54
51. On legal diversity in one region reflecting the differing relation of governors to audiencias,
see JEREMY MUMFORD, VERTICAL EMPIRE: THE GENERAL RESETTLEMENT OF INDIANS IN THE 
COLONIAL ANDES 5 (2012).
52. See Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doc-
trine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2010); KEN MACMILLAN,
SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION IN THE ENGLISH NEW WORLD: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE,
1576-1640 (2006).
53. See Benton & Straumann, supra note 52; MACMILLAN, supra note 52.
54. TOMLINS, supra note 46, at 99; see also BENTON, A SEARCH, supra note 15, at 104-161; 
Benton & Straumann, supra note 52, at 19 (describing the exercise of jurisdiction as evidence of 
claims). 
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Creative applications of Roman law also indicated new possibilities 
for strengthening crown legal authority in colonies. References to Roman 
concepts was important in not only justifying claims to the greater Europe-
an community but also in allowing royal power to be asserted using a more 
extensive range of sovereign and prerogative rights. For Spain, conquest 
and colonization opened the opportunity to assert greater power over the 
church and to contain ecclesiastical jurisdiction.55 For the English crown, 
the “limited efficacy of the English common law” beyond England created 
the conditions for the king-in-council, “ruling through royal prerogatives 
and Roman laws of liberty and natural equity,” to advance more effective 
claims to be the sole vessel of sovereignty and legal authority in the em-
pire.56 Spanish officials, too, drew selectively from sources as diverse as 
statutes, the Siete Partidas, equity, custom, and Roman law, not to mention 
an extended tolerance for continuities in Indian law.57 The crown often
regarded legal diversity as an asset. Spanish officials recognized that legal 
complexity in New Spain and Peru kept subjects connected to the center as 
they searched for support against rivals.58 In Jamaica, the English crown 
actively resisted allowing the colony to adopt the common law wholesale 
because it would limit the sovereign and prerogative rights of the king.59
These points help to show that legal diversity was not necessarily a re-
sult of deviations from or studied ignorance about directions from the cen-
ter. All empires relied on the delegation of legal authority, jurisdictional 
complexity, and the portability of subjecthood, and these phenomena by 
their nature spawned legal diversification. In writing the legal history of 
English colonies in America, we need not search for the moment when a 
colonizing project that was pan-European in origins and language turned 
into an English law of colonizing that centered on land and opened the door 
to common-law influences.60 Legal eclecticism, together with the resulting 
legal diversity, was implicit in the structures and practices of overseas en-
terprise.
55. BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES, supra note 15, at 81-82.
56. See MACMILLAN, supra note 52, at 7.
57. CHRISTOPHER P. ALBI, Derecho Indiano vs. the Bourbon Reforms: The Legal Philosophy of 
Francisco Xavier de Gamboa, in ENLIGHTENED REFORM IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AND ITS ATLANTIC 
COLONIES, C. 1750-1830, at 235 (Gabriel Paquette ed., 2009); see generally BRIAN P. OWENSBY,
EMPIRE OF LAW AND INDIAN JUSTICE IN COLONIAL MEXICO (2008).
58. See John Leddy Phelan, Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy, 5 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 47-65 (1960); see also ALBI, supra note 57, at 229-235; BENTON, LAW AND 
COLONIAL CULTURE, supra note 15, at 83.
59. Letter from Lord Vaughan to The Council for Trade and Plantations (Jan. 28, 1676) (on file 
with the National Archives of the United Kingdom).
60. Tomlins makes this distinction between the law of “colonizing” and the law of “planting,”
though elsewhere he recognizes that there was much overlap. See TOMLINS, supra note 46, at 133.
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At the same time, metropolitan authorities often viewed legal variation 
as a problem to be managed from the center. A further thrust of recent his-
toriography seeks to describe the mechanisms designed to contain diversi-
ty. Ken MacMillan extends backward to the earliest English colonizing 
ventures a constitutional project of an emerging English state to erect a 
unifying framework for colonial law.61 Such a project becomes visible 
when historians adopt a sufficiently flexible understanding of constitution-
alism and its creation. A set of practices managed from the center worked 
both to establish the objective, however elusive, of colonial oversight and 
to draw the margins of permissible legal variation. As MacMillan’s exami-
nation of registers of the Privy Council shows, crown interventions into 
imperial affairs in this early period of English colonization were prompted 
largely by concerns related to the exercise of sovereign, prerogative, and 
imperial rights and responsibilities.62 The exercise of authority over Eng-
lish activities in the Atlantic also was predicated on a relationship of reci-
procity between the king and his subjects, wherein the allegiance of 
English subjects to the crown ensured their continued protection of their 
liberties abroad.63 Yet imperial policy in this period was neither linear nor 
consistent, as the king and his Privy Councilors sought to strike the delicate 
balance between establishing central oversight over issues important to the 
crown and the practical necessity of relinquishing peripheral discretion to 
those involved in the day-to-day business of colonization.64 The evolving 
set of practices of the crown placed limits on colonial autonomy from the 
outset and was integral in shaping what MacMillan characterizes as a “de-
finable, enduring, and bifurcated” Atlantic imperial constitution that bal-
anced the rights of English subjects and the needs of the state.65
Clearinghouses for metropolitan oversight also came in the form of 
the councils appointed to oversee the business of England’s foreign planta-
tions and operating under changing names and structures. The crown ini-
tially conceived the administration of colonial affairs by councils or 
committees as a temporary solution to the overflow of colonial business 
from the Privy Council, but the arrangement became a permanent fixture of 
colonial administration by the late seventeenth century.66 Though perhaps 
best known for their regulation of imperial commerce and enforcement of 
61. See generally KEN MACMILLAN, THE ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION: CENTER AND 
PERIPHERY IN THE ENGLISH ATLANTIC WORLD (2011).
62. Id. at 4-8.
63. Id. at 82, 114.
64. Id. at 6-8.
65. Id. at 170.
66. Id. at 7-8, 145-146.
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trade laws, such bodies did much more than regulate commerce. To ensure 
that colonial laws were not repugnant to the laws of England, they drafted 
patents and commissions, gathered information about the administration of 
government and justice in the colonies, wrote and amended governors’
instructions, and reviewed colonial legislation.67 Although no regular or 
systematic review of colonial legislation was made by the Privy Council or 
an administrative committee for the plantations before the Restoration in 
1660, by the late seventeenth century the power exercised by metropolitan 
officials to review, and either to amend or to annul, colonial statutes 
formed the backbone of the crown’s efforts to manage legal variation in the 
colonies.68 Regulatory concerns of the crown regarding colonial statutes 
ranged from those involving the empire at large—such as suppressing pira-
cy and regulating the Atlantic slave trade—to those affecting only a few 
colonists on one island in the Caribbean.69
A central insight derived from such findings is that the constitution of 
the early English “empire” contemplated diversity while seeking to manage 
it. A key element of this constitutionalism was the elaboration of a doctrine 
of repugnance permitting all colonial legal orders latitude up to the point of 
adopting laws that were held to be repugnant within English law. Although 
the doctrine of repugnance was consistent throughout the centuries of Eng-
lish colonizing as well as commanding in some times and places, we cannot 
separate its influence from the institutional practices that in their operation 
refined the meaning of repugnance (and therefore the foundational content 
of English law) and that cast a wide net for laws and practices to place 
under review. As Mary Sarah Bilder notes in reporting the strategic misrep-
67. The first council commissioned by the crown with responsibilities specifically related to the 
consideration of colonial affairs was created in 1615, when the king commissioned several Privy Coun-
cilors to consider pleas for transportation to overseas settlement. Id. at 145; see also, Charles M. An-
drews, British Committees, Commissions and Councils of Trade and Plantations 1622-1675, in 26
ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL HISTORY 9-10 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies ed., 1908).
68. ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE 
KING-IN-COUNCIL 16 (1915); Kathryn Walker, Imperial Administrative Innovations and Adaptions: 
Poynings Law in Jamaica (Dec. 2013) (manuscript presented at the Atlantic History Workshop, New 
York University, Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author and Chicago-Kent Law 
Review).
69. When the Lords of Trade considered a set of laws transmitted from Jamaica in 1676, their 
concerns over various statutes included those posing a direct threat to the royal prerogative—such as 
language reserving penalties to the public use of the island rather than to the king directly—to concerns 
over the fees allotted for the marshall’s fee for facilitating the executions of persons. A transcript of the 
minutes notes that “[i]n the Act for regulating the fees of the several offices, the Lords order that Sir 
Thomas Lynch be spoken to concerning the Marshall’s fee . . . for executing persons which seems to be 
too great, but he informed their Lordships that the Marshall was at great charges in hiring an execution-
er and burying the person so ‘the fee agreed.’” GREAT BRITAIN PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, CALENDAR OF 
STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1675–1676, at p. 393 (W. Noel Sains-
bury ed., 1893), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=7xIFAAAAYAAJ&lpg.
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resentations of Rhode Island colonists when writing to England about the 
legislation of the colony, officials on both sides of the Atlantic were mak-
ing judgments about repugnance and the latitude for legal variation.70 We 
must look to the legal politics of both the center and the colonies to under-
stand how and why particular constellations of law were coming into exist-
ence.
IV. LEGAL CONVERGENCE IN COLONIAL AMERICA
We are now within sight of the complex context for Nelson’s contri-
butions. Before examining his work in more detail and extrapolating its 
method, we need to comment on one additional possibility for investigating 
legal diversity—one that Nelson observes with mild skepticism. Some his-
torians have sought to explain legal diversity in English colonies by refer-
ence to the characteristics and legal heritage of migrant streams.71 Nelson 
recognizes these influences—for example, acknowledging the importance 
of Puritan reliance on scripture in the early development of Massachusetts 
law.72 Yet he does not give exclusive weight to migrants’ origins in ex-
plaining legal diversity.73 Instead, he folds this factor into a bundle of 
formative conditions and even portrays it as subordinate in importance to 
local politics and, especially, elite strategies. And although noting that col-
onists were responding actively to pressures from London, Nelson does not 
rest his account of legal convergence entirely on increasingly meddlesome 
imperial policy and colonists’ strategies in response.74
Instead, in Nelson’s account, convergence begins early, even as varied 
legal systems take shape.75 In addition to the argument that different local 
social and political conditions produced diversity, Nelson notes that in 
broad structural terms, “the common social and economic realities that 
colonists faced” drove law along parallel paths before 1660.76 Those paths 
led to the construction of the rule of law, in a development that drew from, 
and in turn reinforced, elements of a shared English legal culture. As Nel-
son puts it, convergence was grounded in a “shared commitment to govern 
under the rule of law and to extract governing law from their English legal 
70. MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE 
AND THE EMPIRE 51-73 (2004). 
71. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 6, 783;
see also TOMLINS, supra note 46, at 215-30.
72. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 53.
73. Id. at 125-131.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 125.
76. NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES, supra note 2, at 7.
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heritage.”77 The common law entered at different moments and by different 
means but gradually became key to every colony’s legal system.
Parts of this argument are more explicit than others. Nelson credits 
John Phillip Reid with the insight that colonists sought stability through the 
rule of law as a solution to diverse problems of order.78 In Massachusetts, 
the impulse to contain disorder derived from the perception of the arbitrary 
power of magistrates, a sentiment that again would play a central role in 
legal reform in the British Empire in the early nineteenth century.79 In Vir-
ginia, property transactions established a craving for stability and a code of 
law.80 Nelson gives credit to Pennsylvania’s Quaker elite for realizing the 
value of legitimate legal institutions to the colony’s prospects.81 Elsewhere,
factional politics stymied rule-of-law colonial projects. But even in the 
most chaotic settings, Nelson glimpses the potential for stability and sug-
gests the centrality of the courts in cultivating confidence in authority, or at 
the very least enhancing recognition of local government’s legitimate juris-
diction.82
If disorder in Nelson’s story gives rise to visions of order, his narrative 
is less clear in explaining why specifically the common law featured so 
prominently in colonists’ solutions. Here Nelson implicitly credits the col-
onists’ common legal culture.83 To be sure, Nelson’s legal culture is more 
repertoire than script; even in places where it was invoked inconsistently, 
“English common law was present in the background.”84 Variations of such 
basic practices as the composition of juries and the use of writs prevailed, 
for example, in the smaller New England colonies even as their legal sys-
tems drew closer to that of Massachusetts.85 The element of legal culture 
shared by these colonies was the pursuit “of some form of law to rein in 
judicial discretion.”86 Similarly, in analyzing the diverse legal puzzles of 
the middle colonies and the Carolinas, Nelson proposes a patterned dynam-
ic—the tension between top-down imposition of the common law and bot-
tom-up attempts to preserve local norms—as both productive and reflective 
77. Id. at 129.
78. See id. (referencing JOHN P. REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE 
17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES (2004)).
79. Id. at 9-10, 127-128.
80. NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES, supra note 2, at 78.
81. Id. at 99-101.
82. E.g., NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 111-118.
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id. at 90.
85. NELSON, CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 91-95.
86. Id. at 98.
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of a shared perspective on law.87 Neither elites managing the judiciary nor 
colonists seeking protections in juries could be said to have a more or less 
authentic or inherently persuasive take on the possibilities of the common 
law.
In Nelson’s analysis, legal culture informed legal strategy, but the en-
dorsement of the common law derived from a bargain struck when colo-
nists at different places in the colonial hierarchy perceived that “it provided 
a service for which people were prepared to pay.”88 Without explicitly em-
phasizing legal culture as an element of the emergence, by 1730, of a colo-
nial legal order in which the common law was “in force everywhere,” 
Nelson describes participation in the legal arena as conditioned by the 
combination of the exigencies of settlement and the search for order.89
Without citing Reid in this context, Nelson might be building on the per-
spective elaborated in Reid’s Law for the Elephant. In examining the many 
ways that emigrants on the overland trail in the nineteenth century drew on 
their knowledge of the law to guide their interactions, Reid describes his 
topic as “a behaviorism based on law,” or patterned actions founded on 
“legal habit” and “the strength of custom.”90 Just as Reid’s emigrants relied 
on practical knowledge of the law in guiding property transactions and 
resolving disputes, Nelson’s colonists use the law they knew strategical-
ly—sometimes inconsistently, and often in doctrinally plural or even in-
consistent ways, but always with reference to familiar legal idioms.91
Nelson does not point to shared culture as the bedrock of American law but 
instead points to the power of a plastic legal culture to provide the material 
for a family of common-law adaptations. Like colonists’ growing confi-
dence in the rule of law, their cultural perspectives and expectations 
emerged as they applied their knowledge about law to legal politics: slow-
ly, one conflict at a time.
V. CONCLUSION
Our triptych shows three facets of the law of empire. In the first, net-
works carry legal processes across colonies while setting in motion locally 
distinctive adaptations. In the second, political forces from the center shape 
legal policies while also producing the ideological foundations and political 
87. NELSON, MIDDLE COLONIES, supra note 2, at 8.
88. Id. at 44.
89. Id. at 146.
90. JOHN P. REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE 
OVERLAND TRAIL 11, 19 (1980). See generally JOHN P. REID, POLICING THE ELEPHANT: CRIME,
PUNISHMENT, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1997).
91. REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, supra note 90, at 183-84, 335.
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conditions for colonial legal diversity. In the third, colonial legal configura-
tions reflect varied local conditions, with similar problems of order, proper-
ty, and legitimacy urging parallel legal solutions.
In the first two volumes of The Common Law in Colonial America,
Nelson has given us a clear image of the third panel of our triptych. Subse-
quent volumes promise to sharpen this picture by delineating colonial re-
sponses to policies from the center. The portrait of legal diversity and 
convergence belongs to a broader project of assessing an open-ended poli-
tics surrounding the emerging imperial constitution. While still looking 
forward to the late-eighteenth-century rupture and American constitutional-
ism, Nelson’s project sketches a theory of legal convergence that roots 
rule-of-law consensus and other elements of American legal culture in co-
lonial conflicts that took place well before the revolutionary period.
Contemplating this picture, historians work to refine understandings of 
cross-colonial movements and continue to uncover clumsy but significant 
mechanisms of imperial legal oversight. As increasingly intricate images of 
colonial and imperial law emerge from these efforts, scholars will do well 
to refer to Nelson’s volumes on the common law in America and to com-
pare, as he does, colonies to one another rather than to an idealized or im-
agined metropolitan law. The three-part method devised by Nelson and 
other gifted legal historians will integrate fully the history of colonial 
American law into a global and comparative history of empire and law.
